Introduction
One feels embarrassed to put the question in the title of this paper to colleagues wellversed in social scientific research:
Development and migration -migration and development: what comes first?
The answer is obvious, and I am sure we all agree on it:
The two are part of the same process and therefore constantly interactive.
The question is thus both redundant and nonsensical. And yet I believe that we need to engage seriously with it, for three reasons.
The first became clear to me quite recently when speaking to a former very senior European Union functionary (whom I will not name). I was putting the argument that development policies cannot reduce international migration, because a higher level of development brings more mobility, not less -at least for a considerable period. This point was argued back in 1990 by the late Georges Tapinos (Tapinos 1990) , and is now one of the few things that virtually all migration scholars agree with. But the exofficial in question (who had been involved in the EU's external affairs policies) looked quite shocked, and said that I had undermined one of his most strongly held beliefs.
What does this anecdote tell us? That politicians, officials and the public still believe that if we can only work out and tackle the so-called 'root causes' of international migration, we can drastically reduce it. This also carries the unspoken, common sense message that international migration (especially from South to North) is a bad thing that ought to be stopped.
The second reason, which is closely linked, is that our research findings are not being listened to and understood. If decision-makers still do not understand one of the most basic facts about the migration/development relationship, then either there is something wrong with the research carried out by migration scholars, or we have failed to bridge the gap with decision-makers -or both. In fact I believe that it is both. The fragmentation and narrowness of migration studies that many of us have written about (Castles 2007; Massey, et al. 1998; Portes 1999; Portes and DeWind 2004; Zolberg 1989) ; (Brettell and Hollifield 2007) means that our research does not build on shared concepts and questions, and does not, on the whole lead, lead to an accumulation of knowledge. And even when we do agree on something important, we have not been very good at getting it over to non-specialists.
The third reason is that there has recently been a change in the conventional wisdom about international migration and development. I use the term 'conventional wisdom' in the sense put forward by John Kenneth Galbraith (Galbraith 1958 ) to refer to something that is so obvious that it does not even need arguing (e.g. the belief held in 1960 that smoking was not harmful to health). One could also use the term 'common sense' as applied by Gramsci (Gramsci, et al. 1971) . The conventional wisdom about migration and development until recently was a predominantly pessimistic view: as an ILO official interviewed in the 1990s commented: 'migration and developmentnobody believes that anymore' (Massey, et al. 1998, 260) . In the last ten years there has been a major conceptual shift. As Kathleen Newland has written, there been a 'new surge of interest' (Newland 2007) in migration and development. Many academic studies now show how migration can have positive results for countries of origin. A series of reports and policy statements has shown that international agencies and the governments of both migrant-sending and receiving countries believe that migration can make an important contribution to the development of poorer countries.
This last point actually raises two sets of questions:
• If, as Galbraith wrote, 'the enemy of the conventional wisdom is not ideas but the march of events', what events or crucial changes in economic and social conditions have led to the paradigm shift? • If, on the other hand, the world has not changed that much, our questions must be led by the sociology of knowledge: in what ways have economic and political interests changed so that perceptions or desires concerning the development/migration relationship have been fundamentally transformed?
In this paper I will reflect on these problems by, 1. Giving a brief history of academic debates on international migration and development; 2. Examining the politics of migration and development, using EU policy approaches as examples; 3. Discussing an alternative approach to migration and development based on a conceptual framework and methodology derived from the analysis of social transformation processes; 4. Re-assessing some key aspects of the migration/development relationship in the light of a social transformation approach; and 5. Finally asking whether economic development is in fact likely to reduce emigration from poor countries?
One aim of this initial debate between a development economist (Gustav Ranis) and a migration specialist (myself) was to see how development studies and migration studies differ and how they can intersect. In this particular case, the dialogue was complicated by the fact that Prof. Ranis built his theoretical approach on the analysis of internal migration, extending it only later to international migration, while I start from international migration and see internal rural-urban migration as part of the social transformation processes that form my central analytical category. My paper does address the distinctions between analyses of migration starting from development economics and those deriving from the political economy and sociology of international migration (which I call 'historical-institutional approaches' below). I will come back to differences and similarities at the end of the paper.
A short history of the academic debate on migration/development linkages
It is impossible to provide an adequate history of intellectual trends in this area in a brief paper. The aim here is simply to provide a rough overview to contextualise contemporary debates.
During the 1950s and 1960s development economists stressed that labour migration was an integral part of modernization. They were looking first and foremost at the effects of development on migration, but also at reciprocal effects of migration on development, namely that the reduction of labour surpluses (and hence unemployment) in areas of origin and the inflow of capital through migrant remittances could improve productivity and incomes (Massey, et al. 1998, 223) .
The governments of countries like Morocco, Turkey and the Philippines shared this view. In the 1960s and 1970s, they encouraged their nationals to migrate to Western Europe or the USA -and later to Gulf oil economies. Such governments claimed that labour export would facilitate economic development at home. However, the longterm results of labour recruitment schemes were often disappointing, with little economic benefit for the country of origin -as shown in particular by a series of studies on Turkey (Abadan-Unat 1988; Martin 1991; Paine 1974) . The result was the predominantly pessimistic view that 'migration undermines the prospects for local economic development and yields a state of stagnation and dependency' (Massey, et al. 1998, 272) .
In the early 21 st century, there has been a remarkable turn-around. After years of seeing South-North migrants as a problem for national identity and social cohesion, and more recently even as a threat to national security, politicians and officials now emphasize the potential of international migration to bring about economic and social development in the countries of origin. Now, ideas on the positive effects of migration on development are at the centre of policy initiatives. There has been a plethora of official conferences and reports on the theme (e.g. DFID 2007; GCIM 2005; World Bank 2006) . In countries of origin like India migrants as being redefined as 'heroes of development' (Khadria 2008) .
So what has been happening? In retrospect, there appear to have been two separate (but often intersecting) discourses: an academic and a policy debate. I will briefly review the academic debate in this section and the policy debate in the next.
The academic debate on migration and development
The main controversy from the 1950s to the 1980s was between neo-classical economic theory and historical-institutional theory. To some extent this can also be seen as a controversy between development economists on the one hand and political economists and sociologists on the other.
Development economists mainly applied neo-classical theory, which emphasised the individual decision to migrate, based on rational comparison of the relative costs and benefits of remaining at home or moving. Neo-classical theory assumed that potential migrants had excellent knowledge of wage levels and employment opportunities in destination regions, and that their migration decisions were overwhelmingly based on these economic factors. Constraining factors, such as government restrictions, were seen as distortions of the rational market. According to the neo-classical model, the mere existence of economic disparities between various areas should be sufficient to generate migrant flows. In the long run, such flows should help to equalize wages and conditions in underdeveloped and developed regions, leading towards economic equilibrium.
The result was an overwhelmingly positive view in the 1950s and 1960s on the linkages between migration for development -a virtuous circle:
Beginnings of development in poor countries Migration Enhanced development
Trend to income equilibrium and elimination of the 'root causes' of migration Less migration.
By contrast, the historical-institutional approach saw migration mainly as a way of mobilising cheap labour for capital. It perpetuated the underdevelopment that was a legacy of European colonialism, exploiting the resources of poor countries to make the rich ones even richer. The intellectual roots of such analyses lay in Marxist political economy -especially in dependency theory, which was influential in Latin America in the 1960s. A more comprehensive 'world systems theory' developed in the 1970s and 1980s. It focused on the way less-developed 'peripheral' regions were incorporated into a world economy controlled by 'core' capitalist nations. The penetration of multi-national corporations into less-developed economies accelerated rural change, leading to poverty, displacement of workers, rapid urbanization and the growth of informal economies.
In the 1970s and 1980s (perhaps as a reflection of broader intellectual trends) the pessimistic view of the historical-institutional approach was dominant. It conceptualised the linkages between migration and development as a vicious circle:
Core-periphery division and dependency Migration Increased dependency of poor countries Impoverishment and income gap get worse Third world labour freely available for capital in core economies.
However, from the 1970s onwards, alternative theoretical models began to emerge, paving the way for the more positive (but also more differentiated) approach characteristic of the current period. These models are making it possible to bridge the old divides, and to work towards a more comprehensive understanding of the migratory process. But this was not just an advance in social scientific analysis -it also related 'the march of events': after the 1973 'oil crisis' there was an important shift in capital investment strategies. Instead of investing in Fordist-type industries in the old industrial areas of Western Europe, North America and Japan, corporations became multi-nationals, and moved labour-intensive production process to low-wages areas of the South (Froebel, et al. 1980 ). This set the stage of a re-assessment of ideas on the costs and benefits of labour migration epitomised in the title of an economic study of the time: Trade in place of migration (Hiemenz and Schatz 1979) .
The new approaches have been characterised as transitional theories by my colleague Hein de Haas (de Haas 2008), because they set out to link mobility to processes of development and economic integration. According to (Zelinsky 1971) , at the beginning of a process of modernisation and industrialisation, there is frequently an increase in emigration, due to population growth, a decline in rural employment and low wage levels. As industrialisation proceeds, labour supply declines and domestic wage levels rise; as a result emigration falls and labour immigration begins to take its place. This 'mobility transition' parallels the 'fertility transition' through which populations grow fast as public health and hygiene improves, and then stabilise as fertility falls in industrial countries. A more recent concept used to describe this pattern is the 'migration hump': a chart of emigration shows a rising line as economic growth takes off, then a flattening curve, followed in the long run by a decline, as a mature industrial economy emerges (Martin and Taylor 2001) . Another theory that links migration with broader social changes is to be found in the work of geographer Ronald Skeldon, who suggests a spatial typology of migratory situations (Skeldon 1997) .
Without going further into these complex debates, it is important to see that advances in migration theory are making it possible to move towards more holistic understandings of the of the migratory process. The key ideas of some of new migration theories come from different disciplines, but they seem highly compatible with each other. Apart from the transitional theories already mentioned, the newer approaches include:
• The new economics of labour migration (NELM), which remains within the neoclassical paradigm of income maximisation and trends towards equilibrium, yet questions neo-classical theory's methodological individualism, by emphasising the role of families and communities in migration decisions. NELM uses methods such as qualitative interviews and household survey that are similar to those used by anthropologists and sociologists. (The 'migration hump' idea, of course, was linked to the NELM approach).
• Dual or segmented labour market theory, which analyses the differentiated labour demand of employers as a key factor in causing and structuring migration.
• Migration networks theory, which shows the collective agency of migrants and their communities in organising processes of migration and incorporation.
• Transnational theory: as a result of new transport and communications technologies it becomes increasingly easy for migrants to maintain long-term economic, social, cultural and political links across borders. Transnational communities (or diasporas) are becoming increasingly important as social actors.
Such approaches also correspond with tendencies in mainstream social theory to overcome the old structure/agency dichotomy, and to re-theorise the links between human action (individually and in groups) and broader processes of change in social structures (de Haas 2008) . These innovations in migration theory could therefore help change the marginal position of migration studies within the social sciences -which, as I have argued elsewhere, is a result of the way it has been dominated by national assumptions and driven by policy considerations in the past, (Castles 2007) .
The politics of migration and development; the EU for example
In migration studies, the topics of investigation, the research questions and even the findings of migration studies have frequently been driven by policy considerations. This is an important problem as it can undermine the scientific nature of investigation in this area, and isolate migration studies from broader social inquiry. Here I will just mention one example: the links between migration control policies and understandings of migration/development linkages in the European Union and its member states. As background it is important to know that free movement of labour within the then European Community (EC) was always a central principle, laid down by the 1957 Treaty of Rome, and implemented in 1968. However, the common policy did not apply to 'third country nationals' -conditions for their entry, residence and employment remained an important aspect of national sovereignty for member states. This changed with the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which provided for common rules on asylum and integration, to be implemented by 2004. However, the 2004 agreements (at the time of the extension of the EU to 25 members) only partially lay down common polices, and many issues connected with immigration remain national prerogatives.
A very brief history of the migration history of the EU and its predecessor until 1993, the European Community (EC) needs to emphasise the following milestones. The industrial core of the EC (Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands) recruited Italian labour in the 1950s and early 1960s, but the very success of the EC in equalising economic and social conditions led to a decline in intra-community mobility by the mid-1960s. More and more migrant workers came from outside the EC, especially from Turkey and North Africa. After the 1973 oil crisis, governments tried to stop labour entries, and were amazed to find these transformed into family reunion and settlement (see Castles 1986) . After the end of the Cold War, the EU experienced an upsurge in both labour migration and asylum seekers from the East and South. Migration became highly politicised. The EU and the member states worked together on strategies to cut asylum seeker entries, reduce irregular migration and enhance border control.
However, the early 2000s saw a new debate on Europe's 'demographic decline' and the long-term need for both highly-skilled and less-skilled workers. The European Commission argued that a system to recruit labour at all skilled levels was essential (CEC 2005b) . The member states were unwilling to grasp the nettle of legal recruitment of low-skilled workers, due to a very hostile public climate. The result was an EU Policy Plan (CEC 2005a ) that concentrated on attracting the highly skilled from the rest of the world. The plan paid lip-service to the need to link migration to development of countries of origin while essentially leaving low-skilled migration to market forces -that is to irregularity (see Castles 2006) .
What has all this got to do with research on migration and development? It is important to look at the interplay between political and economic interests and migration research. The sudden discovery in the mid-1970s (referred to above) that trade was better than migration for developing countries came just when the government of Europe had decided to stop recruitment, and the corporations had decided to increase investment in new industrial areas. When asylum became a key political issue in Europe, government sought to restrict it partly through strict border control, partly through ideas for 'off-shore processing', but also partly through addressing the 'root causes' of flight -defined as impoverishment and violence.
Conflict resolution strategies and developmental approaches became highly fashionable around 2001 (Castles and Van Hear 2005; Oxfam 2005) . The UK Government suggested that the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 was no longer appropriate, because in a situation of enhanced global migration flows, it was creating the conditions for misuse of the asylum system by economic migrants. To save the Convention, then UN Refugee Commissioner Rudd Lubbers suggested 'Convention Plus', a set of measures to safeguard asylum while also addressing the issue of 'mixed flows' and the causes of forced migration. Similar objectives are to be found in the French approach (also later adopted by Italy) of co-developpement, which means linking development measures for African countries to measures to encourage return migration. At the 2001 Seville European Council, the British and Spanish governments tried to get the EU to agree to make development aid dependent on the signing of re-admission agreement for deported migrants by poor countries (Castles, et al. 2003) ..
The point is that social science research was always readily available to support such initiatives -whether building walls, off-shore processing, root causes measures, codeveloppement or broader 'developmental approaches'. This does not necessarily imply that social scientists were unduly influenced by those in power -although the strategic use of research funding and consultancy contracts by governments can certainly push researchers in certain directions. It is equally possible that the controversies within migration studies and our inability to agree a common body of theory and knowledge makes it possible for policy makers to choose from a menu of products or findings, to suit the policy fashion of the day. There are also scholars who show the fallacies of wall-building, co-developpement and so on -but they can be ignored in favour of those who are 'on message'.
We should therefore ask ourselves: does the recent turn to more positive views of the migration/development relationship really reflect a scientific revolution (in Kuhn's sense Kuhn 1996) , or is it just that policy makers have given the nod to this approach because it fits current political needs? It is hard to come to a conclusion on this, but one would like to believe the former. Recent approaches could imply a trend towards a new synthesis that goes across old disciplinary and paradigmatic boundaries, and that could allow real advances in theory and knowledge in this field. But that is not automatically the case. It is really up to social scientists working on migration and development to develop these new approaches further, and to make sure that we are not pushed to adopt research topics and questions that feed into short-term policy needs. That requires a much more concerted attempt to theorise the migration/development relationship, and to link it with the most advanced ideas of contemporary social research concerned with broader processes of societal development across a range of disciplines.
Understanding the relationship between global change, social transformation and human mobility
This section explores in a very preliminary way some ideas for taking forward the analysis of the migration/development relationship. It falls into a sub-section on the theoretical basis and another on the methodological consequences.
Conceptual framework
A key reason for the shortcomings of migration and development research lies in its isolation from broader trends in contemporary social theory. In the epoch of the rise of the nation-state, international migration was seen as peripheral, because the national industrial society was understood as the 'container' for all aspects of social being (Faist 2000; Wieviorka 1994) . Crossing borders was the exception and a deviation from the nation-state model. Specific national assumptions on ways of excluding or assimilating migrants became the unquestioned conventional wisdom of social sciences based on 'methodological nationalism'. (Beck 2007; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) . Migration thus played little part in classical social science, which was primarily concerned with social order in bounded societies; however, this did include strategies for controlling internal 'dangerous classes' or colonised 'dangerous peoples' (Connell 1997) . The result has been that research on migration has mainly been done by migration specialists, while research on development has been the preserve of development specialists. Both groups have tended to be isolated from each other and from mainstream social theory.
In the past, research on migration and development has had little impact on core theories of social order and differentiation. However, in recent times, globalisation has challenged national models in the social sciences and drawn attention to crossborder flows as key instruments of change. There are signs of a new emphasis on human mobility in social theory, and some key works on global change (such as (Bauman 1998; Beck 2007; Cohen and Kennedy 2000; Held, et al. 1999 ) now stress the centrality of migration in contemporary social relations. This shift is not surprising: if the principle of the 'container society' is no longer sustainable (even as a myth), then flows across borders become a crucial area of investigation for the social sciences. Economics recognised this for commodity and capital flows before political science and sociology learnt the lesson for governance, cultural and social relations, but now this priority is inescapable for all social scientists.
A central concept for analysing the links between human mobility and global change is to be found in the process of social transformation. A useful point of departure is Polanyi's (Polanyi 2001 ) work on the 'great transformation' of European societies through industrialisation and the ideology of self-regulating markets. According to Polyani, the market liberalism of the 19 th century ignored the embeddedness of the economy in society (i.e. its role in achieving social goals laid down by politics, religion and social custom). The liberal attempt to disembed the market was a 'stark utopia' leading to a double movement -a protective countermovement to resubordinate the economy to society. Unfortunately, in the early 20 th century, the countermovement lead inexorably to fascism and world war (Block and Polanyi 2003; Polanyi 2001 ).
Globalisation (especially since the end of the Cold War) represents a new fundamental shift in economic, political and military affairs. The resulting social transformation in developed countries can be seen in the closure of older industries, the restructuring of labour forces, the erosion of welfare states and the decline of communities. In less-developed countries, forms of social transformation include intensification of agriculture, destruction of rural livelihoods, erosion of local social orders, rural-urban migration and formation of vast shanty-towns within new megacities. The recent upsurge in South-North migration can best be understood through examination of these complementary changes and their complex linkages.
It is possible to draw on emerging ideas from a range of disciplines to develop a new approach to understanding transformation-mobility relationships. In economics, Stiglitz has provided a critique of neo-liberal economic globalisation, derived from Polanyi's concept of transformation (Stiglitz 1998; Stiglitz 2002) . For him, the 'double movement' is represented by anti-globalisation activism (see Stiglitz's Foreword to (Polanyi 2001) . Milanovic shows that the neo-liberal claim of improving economic outcomes for poor countries has masked a vast increase in inequality (Milanovic 2007) . In political economy, the neo-liberal model is criticised as a new utopia of a self-regulating world economy (Freeman and Kagarlitsky 2004; Petras and Veltmayer 2000; Weiss 1998 ). Such ideas echo Polanyi's critique of attempts to disembed the economy from society, but they are essentially top-down critiques, which fail to analyse the local effects of global economic and political forces. In order to overcome this disjuncture, it is necessary to apply concepts and methodologies suggested by social anthropologists, development sociologists and other social scientists studying local dimensions of global change (see methodology below).
These trends in mainstream social theory have already influenced migration studies. As outlined above, economists working on migration have become increasingly critical of the emphasis on individual rational choice within neo-classical theory, and are investigating the role of families, communities, and other social actors in migratory processes (Massey, et al. 1998 ). An important advance is the development of network theories, which focus on the collective agency of migrants and communities in organising processes of migration and incorporation (Boyd 1989) . A linked trend is towards investigation of transnational affiliations among migrants (Guarnizo, et al. 2003; Portes, et al. 2007; Vertovec 2004) . Critical analyses of the relationship between migration and security emphasise the important role of demographic trends, institutional change, and the decline of multilateralism (Bigo and Guild 2005; Humphrey 2005; Weiner and Russell 2001) .
The key principle at the conceptual level, therefore, is to embed the study of migration/development relationships in a much broader inter-disciplinary analysis of the development of social structures and relationships in the context of globalisation.
As the brief review above shows, this is not a new idea, and important trends in both broader social theory point in that direction.
Methodology
A revised conceptual framework implies rethinking the methodology of migration and development research. We need to find ways of understanding the relationships between macro-meso-and micro factors of change. This is based on the idea that global factors have different effects at the local and national level, due to the presence of mediating historical experiences and cultural patterns. Put differently, it is crucial to find ways of understanding the relationships between the various socio-spatial levels: global, local, national and regional (Pries 2007) . This principle also underpins the need for interdisciplinarity, since the various disciplines often address different socio-spatial levels.
A primary concern is to overcome methodological nationalism by developing a truly transnational research process based on international and interdisciplinary teams. At the same time, we need to develop instruments for linking analysis of global forces to national and local experiences, drawing on methodological innovations from several disciplines. The 'new economics of labour migration' uses household surveys to understand the complexity of migration decisions and their relationship with other factors (Stark 1991; Taylor 1999 ). Collinson (Collinson 2003) has pioneered 'micropolitical economy' research on livelihoods and commodity chains in conflict areas. Social geographers have developed new ways of understanding the changing meaning of 'territory' and the relationships between spatial levels (Lussault 2007; Sassen 2006 ).
The International Sociological Association (ISA) Research Committee on 'Social Transformation and Sociology of Development' (Schuerkens 2004) use the concept of 'glocalisation' to analyse links between global forces and local life-worlds, and has applied this approach to the mstudy of migration and ethnicity (Berking 2003; Binder and Tosic 2005; Schuerkens 2005 ). Other sociologists show how identity movements arise in reaction to globalisation (Castells 1997) . Social anthropology has moved away from older ideals of authenticity and singularity to study individual and group reactions to globalising forces (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004) . This implies analysing 'a simultaneous dialectic of indigenisation … and cosmopolitanisation' (Friedman 2004) . Concepts and methods for ethnographic work on globally-dispersed communities are discussed by Hage (Hage 2005) , while recent examples of studies on local mediation of global change include (Hogan 2004; Wise and Velayutham 2008) . This is in no way an exhaustive summary of the interesting methodological approaches that are already being tried out in the social sciences. Some are already being applied in migration research and others could and should be.
Re-examining the migration and development mantra
What would a conceptual framework and methodology based on the analysis of social transformation contribute to our understanding of current issues in the migration/development relationship? It could serve as an analytical lens to re-examine some of the main elements of the new conventional wisdom on migration and development. I use the term 'migration and development mantra' here, based on Devesh Kapur's idea that remittances have become a new 'development mantra': governments and officials believe that money sent home by migrants can be a recipe for local, regional and national development (Kapur 2004) . I think it is useful to extend this notion of a 'new mantra' to include the whole range of benefits that migration is said to bring for development.
• Migrant remittances can have a major positive impact on the economic development of countries of origin • Migrants also transfer home skills and attitudes -known as 'social remittances'-which support development • 'Brain drain' is being replaced by 'brain circulation', which benefits both sending and receiving countries • Temporary (or circular) labour migration can stimulate development • Migrant diasporas can be a powerful force for development, through transfer of resources and ideas • Economic development will reduce out-migration.
At present 'the evidence base for the links between migration and development is still very weak' (Newland 2007) . A World Bank study found that the relationship is 'unsettled and unresolved' (Ellerman 2003) , while Massey et al. point to deficiencies in both theoretical understanding and gathering of data on the relationship between migration and development (Massey, et al. 1998, 272) . Thus the evidence on all aspects of the mantra is uneven and contested. It would take far too long to discuss each one in turn here -and in any case this will be covered in other sessions. I simply want to suggest some research questions that could be applied to some or all of them.
What do we mean by development and who decides?
The concept was first coined to refer to postwar reconstruction after 1945 in Europe, and then applied in a topdown way to the post-colonial Third World. It has become a commonsense term, but the original simple definition of development as growth in GDP (absolute or per capita) has been questioned by ideas of human development, human security, development as capability or freedom or autonomy. When the International Migration Institute (IMI) at Oxford University and the Doctoral Programme in Development Studies of the University of Zacatecas recently brought together scholars, government officials and members of migrant associations from some major emigration countries, they questioned the idea that some of the world's most exploited workers should provide the capital for economic growth, where official aid programmes have failed. They argued that a strategy based on exporting workers to richer countries was a sign of the failure to achieve development in the interests of the majority of the population. The implication is that migrants and the communities they come from and go to should have a voice in defining development (Castles and Delgado Wise 2007; Castles and Delgado Wise 2008 ).
Under what conditions can migration contribute to development?
Comparisons of various countries present conflicting evidence. For instance the Philippines has one of the largest and longest-standing emigration programmes -the government's ambition is to be 'the provider of workers for the world' (Asis 2008 ) -yet there is little evidence that it has led to improvements in the economic and social conditions of the people, nor indeed in the quality of public life. Korea by contrast has moved quickly from being an emigration to an immigration country, yet it is not clear whether labour export in the 1970s and 1980s played much part in this (Delgado Wise and Invernizzi 2005) . Turkey had large-scale emigration until the 1980s, which at the same was assessed as having little development benefit, but has now experienced rapid growth and a migration transition (Avci and Kirisci 2008) . Mexico has had very large-scale migration to the USA, but this appears to have led to greater economic dependency and to economic distortions which are not conducive to growth (Delgado Wise and Guarnizo 2007) . There are clearly some major knowledge gaps here, which call for rigorous examination and cross-national comparisons.
Is development an issue of transferring the 'right attitudes' to poorer countries?
The idea that the transfer of western attitudes and forms of behaviour from developed to less-developed countries would bring about positive change goes back to the 19th century idea of the 'civilizing mission' of Europe in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was also central to the modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s (Rostow 1960) , according to which: '[d]evelopment was a question of instilling the "right" orientations -values and norms -in the cultures of the nonWestern world so as to enable its people to partake in the modern wealth-creating economic and political institutions of the advanced West' (Portes 1997, 230) . Such policies failed to stimulate development and to improve the living standards of the poor. More recently, neo-liberal globalisation theory has argued that western models of privatisation and entrepreneurship are crucial to development, yet such approaches have so far led to greater inequality (Milanovic 2007) . Now strategies designed to encourage 'social remittances' and 'diaspora mobilisation for development' are being advocated (see DFID 2007) . We need to examine the relationship between such apparently bottom-up development approaches and macro-level relationships of unequal economic and political power.
Is the 'brain drain' being replaced by 'brain circulation' or a 'brain bank'?
Skilled migration often represents a transfer of human capital from poor to rich countries, But current initiatives by development agencies and international organizations aim to find ways in which skilled migration could be transformed into a global circulation of talents, which might benefit receiving countries, migrants and source countries. Whether this will happen depends on the willingness of the states concerned to cooperate for development. The very strong emphasis on recruiting the highly skilled and excluding the low skilled in the current policies of the EU, UK, France, Germany, USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea and, most recently, China cast doubt on such willingness. Another indication is the continuing rise in recruitment of medical personnel from lessdeveloped countries by Western Europe and the USA (OECD 2007, 162-82) . So the task here is to analyse the interest coalitions that determine such policies, and whether there are levers for change.
Is temporary or 'circular' migration a real possibility, and can it serve the interests of poor countries?
The ambivalence of migration and development policies is perhaps clearest with regard to the renewed enthusiasm for temporary migration -now under the more positive label of circular migration. This is said to benefit the countries of origin, but in reality these would have an interest in permanent emigration of surplus low-skilled workers and temporary emigration of the highly skilled. The interests of labour-importing countries are the opposite, and these have so far prevailed in international debates: lower-skilled migrants are welcome in Europe, North America and the new industrial countries only as temporary 'guestworkers'. Where this proves politically difficult, employers rely on undocumented workers. The ready availability of low-skilled labour in a situation of global surplus gives all the market power to the demand side.
This list of questions is far from exhaustive, and my brief discussion of each indicates how controversial they remain. Clearly, there is a need for much more systematic research, and above all for comparative studies of differing experiences to work out the factors involved, and how they interact. My basic aim here is to indicate the impossibility of making clear statements by looking at migration on its own. Only by analysing it in a framework that links global relationships of economic and political power with national and local experiences of coping with social transformation can we begin to understand the factors that lead to differentiated outcomes.
Will economic development reduce emigration from poor countries?
As I mentioned at the beginning of the paper, powerful decision makers still believe that development can reduce emigration from poor countries to rich -the last point of the migration and development mantra. This is based on two assumptions. The first, which goes back to colonial ideas on the dangers or rural-urban migration, is that migration of poor people to rich areas is intrinsically bad (Bakewell 2007) . The second assumption is that tackling the poverty and violence that force people to move will lead to a decline in migration. The belief in the 'virtuous circle' described earlier is still strong.
In fact there is considerable evidence that improvements in living standards and reductions in violence actually create the conditions for more migration. The citizens of rich countries are highly mobile -although this is often not referred to as migration. Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has argued that the right to be mobile is the badge of the global elite, while the poor are meant to stay at home (Bauman 1998). The policy consequences of recognising that 'development instead of migration' policies are bound to fail (de Haas 2006) were spelled out convincingly in the 2005 Report of the Global Commission on International Migration. The GCIM underlined that migration policies could not be a substitute for much broader policies designed to address underdevelopment and inequality. The world's most prosperous states needed to acknowledge the impact of their own policies on the dynamics of international migration -for instance through trade reform to give developing countries fairer access to global markets (GCIM 2005, section 1, paragraph 49). One might add the need to stop arms exports to conflict regions, as well as for measures to build human rights standards into aid and trade agreements.
As for countries of origin, reliance on migrant remittances to fund development can be misguided. Migration alone cannot bring about development. Where political and economic reform is absent, remittances are more likely to lead to inflation and greater inequality than to positive change. On the other hand, where migration takes place at the same time as improvements in governance, creation of effective institutions, construction of infrastructure and the emergence of an investment-friendly climate, then it can be part of the solution. Policies to maximize the benefits of migration for countries of origin must thus be part of much broader strategies designed to reduce poverty and achieve development (DFID 2007, 37-40) .
Such analyses in policy reports show that some government officials have got the message that the virtuous circle of migration and development is not so simple -even if key decision makers have not. This is important for social scientists, because it shows that our messages do not always fall on deaf ears. It should reinforce our determination to continue to elaborate a critical, interdisciplinary perspective for the analysis of the migration/development relationship. This means working to overcome the barriers that have led to the fragmentation of migration studies and its isolation from innovative trends in social theory.
The key idea is that it is mistaken to see migration and development in isolation from wider issues of global power, wealth and inequality. Mobility of people is an integral part of the major changes currently affecting all regions of world. Studying migration separately from this context is likely to lead to mistaken ideas on its potential for enhancing economic, political and social change. By contrast, conceptualising migration as a key aspect of the social transformations that affect all parts of the world today can enrich both migration studies and the social sciences as a whole.
Re-linking development economics and critical migration theory
The two papers presented at the initial session of the SSRC conference on migration and developed approached the issue in very different ways: Ranis started from a theoretical model of the economics of internal migration, and then tested it against some historical cases to show a wide range of modifying factors. He also argued that the basic model could be extended to international migration, albeit with even more constraints, not least the role of states and their uneven power. He stated that the model suggested a long-term transition to 'a one-sector, relatively full-employment neo-classical world', and argued that this is 'currently happening in such countries as China, Vietnam and Thailand'. However, he also shows the limitations of this model, not least the fact that it cannot explain trends in much of Latin America and SubSaharan Africa.
By contrast I started from a model of complexity and contradictions. My approach was a political economy and sociology of international migration, built around the central concept of social transformation and the way this is brought about simultaneously in South and North by neo-liberal globalisation. Far from a trend towards a 'one-sector neo-classical world', I would argue that globalisation and social transformation means the re-birth of archaic economic patterns in the North: the resurgence of the garment sweatshop, domestic service and the informal sectors in post-industrial economies. The developmental benefits of migration for sending countries are not absent from this model, but are seen as highly uneven, and contingent on a wide range of factors.
Can these very different approaches intersect? That is clearly both an intellectual and a practical problem. On the intellectual level there needs to be a debate about the similarities and difference in the determinants and consequences of internal versus international migration. International migration is not simply an extension of internal migration, but neither can internal migration be treated as essentially a contextual factor for international migration. More fundamentally, starting from simplicity versus starting from complexity cannot be simply resolved by meeting in the middle. Treating half the world as deviations from the model does not verify the model, but too much complexity can lead to resignation. Perhaps both approaches can meet in the search for a more embracing and comprehensive model that goes across disciplines and at least permits middle-range theories.
On the political level, an intersection could be found in the search for developmental approaches that maximise the benefits to be derived from migration while seeking to minimise abuses and negative effects. Ranis' carefully-formulated research questions can help us to reflect on what works and what does not, and that in turn could enhance the search for explanations that might lead to solutions.
